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Loyalty/reqUirement rebates and the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission: What 
is the appropriate liability standard? 
BY NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A number of alternative economic standards have been proposed for 
establishing antitrust liability in cases with requirement/loyalty prac-
tices both in the context of a single product and multiproduct mar-
kets. In general terms, the problem can be described as follows. 
Single-product case: A dominant firm in market A sells at a constant 
per unit price. Provided the particular buyer commits to buying a 
large percentage or all of his "needs" from the dominant firm, the 
seHer also offers a "retroactive"! "discount"2 on all units or a subset of 
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The term "retroactive" is used because the "discount" (or difference 
between prices adhering tC1 and not adhering to the requirement) applies to 
all lmits sold in a time period or a subset thereof, while it may be announced 
in the last part of this time period. This discount is distinguished from an 
© 2009 by Federal Legal Publication s. Inc. 
260 THE A NTI TRUST BULLE TI : Vol. 54, No. 21Sumliler 2009 
units below a certain threshold, such as 90% of the buyer's purchases 
in market A during a defined time period. The retroactive discount 
can be a lower price on all units below the threshold or a subset of 
these, or it can be a lump-sum discount. The requirement may be 
"sole-sourcing," i.e., a requirement that a particular buyer buy 100% 
of his purchases from the dominant firm, or the discount may be 
available only if a large percentage of the buyer's purchases in market 
A, say 85% or 90% or 95%, are from the dominant firm.3 The require-
ment, the base prices, the extent of the discounts, and even the time 
period on which it applies can vary across buyers.4 
"incremental" discount which is applied only to the las t unit or units sold. 
For similar definitions, see European Commission, Guidance on the Commis-
sion 's EI~forcemcnt Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclu-
sionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings 'If 36 (Dec. 2008) [hereinafter Ell 
A,-ticlc 82 Guidance]. 
The word "discount" here can be misleading. A"ter meeting the con-
dition, the firm receives a price lower than that charged when the condition is 
not met. However, the price outside the condition as well as the price under 
the condition may be higher than those of the but-for world, cwd therefore 
the "discount" can be illusory. Thus, a loya lty discount can also be called a 
"disloya lty penalty." See Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive 
Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States in tlte After-
math of the Microsoft Cases, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3, 
on file with the author) ; EIN"ER EU-lAUGE, UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 406, 408 (2008); Patrick Greenlee, David Reihnan & David S. Sib-
ley, An Antitnlst A nalysis of Bundled Loyalty Discount 23 (Dep't. of Justice, 
Econ. Analysis Group, Discussion Paper No. 04-13, 2004); Daniel L. Rubin-
feld, 3M's Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective, 72 U. Cm L. REV. 243, 252 
(2005) . 
For the arguments I make here it is not necessary to have the d iscount 
apply to all units . 
The European Commission also distinguishes between individualized 
and standardized discounts. In contrast to U.s. antitrust law, EU's article 82 
may apply to both types of discounts, although standardized discounts are 
treated more leniently. See ELf Article 82 Guidance, supra note I , 'If 44: 
It is normally important to conside r whether the rebate system is 
applied with an individualized o r a standardi zed threshold. An indi-
vidualized threshold-one based on a percentage of the total require-
ments of the customer or an individualized volume target-allows 
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Multi-product case: A dominant finn in market A also sells in market 
B. It sells products A and B a la carte. Based on a requirement that a par-
ticular buyer buy a large percentage or 100% of his needs in both prod-
ucts from the dominant firm, the dominant firm also offers discounts on 
allmuts of either A, or B, or buth, or provides a lmop-sum cliscount.5 
It makes sense to appiy the same antitrust standard for cliscolmts on 
loyalty /requirement practices irrespective of whether we are in a single-
product or multiproduct case. In the former case, the demand is divided 
between an uncontested part that is always purchased from the donli-
nant firm and a contested part of the demand where the customer may 
buy from any firm .6 In both the multi- and single-product cases, the 
dominant firm leverages its monopoly or dominant position to obtain 
I1igher sales in the remaining market. The only difference is that in the 
multiproduct case, sales in market A are leveraged to obtain higher sales 
in market B, while in the single-product case, the uncontested sales in 
market A are leveraged to obtain the contested sales in market A.7 
Before going into the details of the proposed legal rules for liabil-
ity, it is worth making the following observations: 
th e dominant supplier to set the threshold at such a level as to make it 
difficult for customers to switch suppliers, thereby crea tin g a maxi-
mum loya lty enhancing effect . By contrast, a standardized volume 
threshold-where the threshold is the sa me for all o r a gro up o f cus-
tomers-may be too high for some smaller customers and /o r too low 
for larger customers to have a loyalty enhancing effect. If, however, it 
can be established that a standardized volume threshold approxi-
mates the requirements of an appreciable proportion of customers, the 
Commission is likely to consider that such a standardized system of 
rebates may produce cmticompetitive foreclosure effects. 
Paragraph 45 discusses the efficiencie.; provided by these two types of discounts. 
This setup can easily be extended to collections of more than two goods. 
This conforms with the definitions used by the European Commission. 
See EU Article 82 Guidance, supra note 1. 
For a discussion of the "a ttraction effect" of rebates from th e domi-
nant firm's perspective and the inherent bias of the system to perpetuate and 
reinforce the dominant firm's p osition in the market, see Martin Bechenkamp 
& Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, An Experimental Investigation of Aiticle 82 Rebates 
Schemes, 2 COMPETITION L. REV. Supr. 1, 14 (2006). Leveraging because of an 
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A. Requirementlloyalty programs can be profitable for a 
dominant firm even if there are no cost savings from joint 
production, joint distribution of products A and B or from 
higher production levels 
As I will discuss below, the introduction of requirement/loyalty dis-
count programs can work for the benefit of the dominant firm because 
such programs enable the extension of the monopoly from one market 
to the other or from one segment of the market to another segment of 
the market. Thus, the profitability for the dominant firm of the introduc-
tion of such a requirement/loyalty discount program is not dependent 
on cost savings of joint production or joint distribution (economies of 
scope) in the multiproduct case, or on higher sales of operation and 
therefore wider spreading of fixed costs (economies of scale) in the sin-
gle-product case. The leverage can be a sufficient and profitable justifica-
tion for the introduction of requirement/loyalty discount programs in 
the absence of any cost savings of joint production, joint distribution, or 
higher sales of operation. If such savings exist, they can be taken into 
consideration as efficiencies to cOlmterbalance consumer losses, but cost 
savings are not necessary causes for a dominant firm to profitably intro-
duce a requirement/ loyalty discount program. 
B. Conditions under which such requirement/loyalty programs 
are not profitable for a dominant firm are eXCI'ptionaL 
Clearly a bundling program can be profitable because of savings 
in joint production or joint distribution costs. Similarly in the single-
product case, economies of scale can lead to increased profits in the 
presence of a loyalty discount program. For the arguments of this 
subsec~ion, let us assume that there are no joint production or joint 
distribution savings in the multiproduct case or economies of scale 
in the single-product case. Under these circumstances, profi t 
increases as a result of the introduction of the loyalty/requirement 
program must come from revenue enhancement. The objective of a 
attrac tion effect mLlY have inspired the position o f the EU on conditional 
rebates. See EU Article 82 Guidance, supra note 1, ~l 38 . See also Ioal~nis Lianos 
& Abel Mateus, Antit11lst in the New U.S. /ldminist ratioll: A Transatlantic View, 
GLOBAL C OMPETmON PoL'Y MAG., Jan. 2009, at 30, available at http://ssm.com 
/ abstract=1399693. 
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requirement/loyalty discount program then is to extract more con-
sumer surplus and convert it to profit of the seller8 To be profitable, 
the dominant firm's bundling scheme needs to leverage some left-
over consumer surplus in market A to induce the buyer to buy more 
of product B from the dominant firm. If a buyer is left with no con-
sumer surplus before the bundle is introduced, the seller has no 
leverage to induce the buyer to buy more of product B from him. 
Additionally, if a dominant firm in market A is able to extract the 
full consumer surplus from each and every consumer in market A, 
there is no additional surplus in market A that the dominant firm 
can gain by introducing a requirement/loyalty program that 
involves market B. 
Thus, under very special conditions, when prior to the introduc-
tion of the requirement/loyalty program a monopolist in market A is 
able to extract the full consumer surplus from each and every con-
sumer in market A, the requirement/loyalty program would not be 
useful in increasing profits to a dominant firm 9 This can occur when 
each buyer buys only one unit and the seller is able to sell to each 
buyer at the price that buyer is willing to pay, thereby leaving no con-
sumer surplus for any buyer. Or, more generally, a seller sells many 
units to each buyer, but is able to offer very sophisticC1ted individually 
tailored pricing that extracts all consumer surplus from all units 
bought by each buyer. 
In the very spec;al case described above, profitable requirement / 
loyalty practices can be explained only on the basis of efficiencies in 
Consumer surplus is the d ifference between what consumers are w ill-
ing to pay and what they actually pay in a purchase. It represents the net ben-
efit to consumers. 
This assumes that the dominant firm cannot use threats that it will not 
sell the full demanded quantity to buyers that do not adhere to the require-
ment program. When facing a competitor that is w1able to fulfill the uncon-
tested part of the cemand, such threats can easily be used to threaten a 
reduction in the profitability of buyers who have optimized their scale to ·use 
the exact quantity they demand from the dominant seller. In that case, even 
when the dominant firm is ab le to extract the full consumer surpl us from 
every consumer in market A, it can still use the threat of not selling to each 
buyer the full amount of the uncontested part of their demand so as to prot-
itably gain ma rket share in market B or the contested part of market A. 
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join t production, joint distribution, or economies of scale. 1o However, 
in many product markets, each buyer buys more than one unit and 
typically the same buyer assigns a different value (willingness to pay) 
to e~ch of the various units he demands. Then, each buyer is left with 
a positive cons umer surplus under a single-price monopoly, and 
therefore the requirement program can help the monopolist to extract 
more surplus from each buyer in market A. Additionally, even if each 
buyer bought only one unit, typically different buyers vary in their 
willingness to pay. Then again, a single-price monopolist will not be 
able to extract all consumer surplus from the market. ll The require-
ment/ loyalty programs can be sufficiently tailored to the scale of each 
buyer (based on a percentage of his purchases of similar products) so 
that again more surplus is extracted by the monopolist. 
C. Requirementlloyalty programs have implications dramatically 
different from volume discounts, including possible negative 
prices for ranges of units 
A discount given on the basis of a requirement/loyalty program 
should be applied to the units that are contested by a competitor in 
the same market, or in the second market in the multiproduct case. 
When such discounts are subtracted from revenue from contested 
units, the resulting effect!ve price for the contested units can be below 
cost, and even negative, as shown below. This is quite different from a 
volume discount for the last few units (an incremental discount) 
which typically will result in prices above cost. Additionally, a vol-
ume discount (something like taking 15% off the price of units above 
unit 90) will affect the same set of units for each buyer. In contrast, a 
requirement/loyalty program can be written so that the discount will 
apply to different buyers according to the percentage of their pur-
chases from the dominant firm, and therefore it can affect different 
lmits for each buyer. For example, a discount based on a 90% require-
ment/ loyalty program affects different units when applied to a buyer 
10 See Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regu-
lat iO H, 51 Nw. U. 1. REV. 281, 290 (1956) . 
II Even a quantity-based price discount, if the same discount is available 
to all buyers of the same quantity, will leav e some consumer s urplus w ith 
buyers when the buyers vary in their demand for the product. 
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of 100 lffiits than when applied to a buyer of 1000 units. Finally, a vol-
ume discount will tend to be less restrictive since it will not require 
that fewer purchases be made from the rival(s). 
D. Requirementlloyalty retroactive rebates change the nature of 
competition from competition for the last unit to competition 
for large chunks of the demand 
Small changes in the amount bought from a rival can make a dif-
ference in whether a buyer receives a rebate from the dominant fi rm 
or not. For example, consider a buyer who buys 100 units in total 
from the dominant firm and the rival. If the dominant firm's lump-
sum rebate kicks in at the 90th lmit, it is very lffilikely that the buyer 
will buy 89 units, just short of achieving the quota necessary for the 
rebate. A buyer that might have bought 80 units in the but-for world 
in the absence of the rebate will consider buying 90 units to receive 
the rebate. Thus, competition is no longer for the last unit (the 81st 
unit to be sold by the dominant firm) as in the but-for world, but for 
whole chtmks of the demand, here units 81 to 90. This favors the 
dominant fi rm and can lead to foreclosure of the rival who has to 
fight not only for the 81st unit of the dominant firm (his 19th lmit) as 
in the but-for world, but for lmits 81-90 (his units 10-19). This was 
lmderstood by the European Commission: 
Retroactive rebates may foreclose the market significantly, as they may 
make it less attractive for customers to switch small amounts of demand to 
an alternative supplier, if this would lead to luss of the retroactive rebates .I2 
~. Entry issues 
The existence of the requirement/loyalty practice by a dominant 
fir m can foreclose rivals or reduce their scale of operations and 
increase their costs. At the same time, the requirement/loyalty prac-
tice raises the barriers to entry making the business environment less 
competitive.13 In both the single-product and multiproduct cases, the 
monopolist can deter a new entrant by :ocking customers iIlto a 
1.2 ELf Article 82 Cuidance, supra note I, 'II 15. 
,.'\ See Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.]. ECON . 159 
(2004). 
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requirement/loyalty contract. All other things being equal, the cus-
tomer will decide to break the contract with the monopolist only if it 
is compensated by the new entrant's lower price. That is, the monopo-
list has lowered the incentives for entry and thus created barriers for a 
potential new entrant to compete as an efficient competitor. 14 
A dominant firm with market power in two markets where a typi-
cal buyer buys both products can protect itself from entry in either of 
the markets by offering the requirement/loyalty contract. Thus, 
requirement / loyalty contracts may be used as entry-deterring devices 
by making it economically unprofitable for an entrant to enter one 
market without s imultaneousiy entering the second market. ls 
II. ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS FOR LIABILITY 
A number of alternative standards for liability have been pro-
posed. I discuss them from the most lenient standard to the strictest 
standard. 
A. Total bundle cost/revenue comparison 
To apply this standard, proposed by Professor Tim Muris to the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC),16 first you calculate the 
total revenue paid for a blmdle under the requirement/loyalty con-
tract after all discounts are applied. If the resulting revenue is above 
H See Phillip Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Rarrier to Elltry, 77 
AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1987). The paper shows that a monopolist can extract a 
new entrant's techn"logy advantage using contracts which require 100% of a 
customer's total purchases. 
I ' See, e.g., Nalebuff, supra note 13; Rubinteld, supra note 2, at 257; and 
Aaron S. Edlin & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Exclusio1l or Efficient Pricing? The "Big 
Deal" Bundling of Academic Journals, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 119 (2004). 
16 See Timothy J. Muris, Comments 011 Antitnlst Law, Economics, and BUIl-
died Discounts (submitted to the AMC on behalf of the United States Telecom 
Ass'n, July IS, 2005). Sec also Timothy J. Muris, Antitrust Law & Economics: 
Exclusionary Behavior, Bundled Discounts and Refusals to Deal (Nov. 29, 2006). 
This standard was also proposed by Pacific Telephone Co. and Visa USA and 
rejected by the 9th Circuit in PeaceHealth. See Brief of Pacific Td. Co. & Visa 
USA as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Cascade Health Solutions v. 
PeaceHealth, 542 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 05-36153). 
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viHiable cost (avoidable cost), there is no !iability. If the resulting price 
is below avoidable cost, you examine whether the loss can be reason-
ably recouped . There \s antitrust liability only if the loss cannot be 
reasonably recouped . 
This standard completely ignores bundling issues. You can easily 
have a collection of products sold above cost while some of the prod-
ucts are individually sold below cost. This concept of having a collec-
tion of products sold above cost while some are individually sold 
below cost has been well understood in telecommunications markets 
since the 1970s, when competition emerged in some markets w hile 
monopoly remained in others. In effect, the Muris standard makes 
bundling per se legal, as pointed out by Jonathan Jacobson,17 since the 
Su preme Court has accepted a comparison of the defendants' costs 
and revenues as a predation test, whether or not there is bundling 
involved. ls Thus, the Muris standard is clearly inappropriate for judg-
ing bundling and requirement practices issues. 
B. The AMC standard for multiproduct conditional discounts 
To apply this standard, you take all the conditional discounts given to 
a particular buyer and apply them to all the units of product B (the non-
monopolized product) sold by the dominant firm / monopolist in market 
A to this buyer, thereby creating an "effective price" for product B. An 
antitrust violation exists only if all three of the following conditions hold: 
(1) the resulting "effective price" is below the average variable cost of 
product B of the monopolist in product A; (2) the dominant firm is likely to 
recoup its losses; and (3) the requirement contract is likely to have anti-
competitive consequences. 19 The AMC suggests the following safe har-
17 Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exploring the Antitrust Modernization Commis-
sioH's Proposed Test For Bundled Pricing, ANTITRUST, Summer 2007, a t 23. 
18 See Brooke Group Ltd . v. Brown & Will iam son Tobacco Corp., 509 U.s. 
209 (1993); and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 
127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007). 
19 See ANmRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 99 (Apr. 2007) ("Courts should adopt a three-part tes t to determine 
whether bWldled discounts or rebates violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
To prove a vio lation of Section 2, a plaintiff should be required to show each 
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bor: no antitrust violation exists if the resulting effective price is above 
average variable cost of product B of the monopolist in product A.20 
The AMC standard for multiproduct conditional discounts has a 
number of defects. First it uses the monopolist's costs rather than the 
rival's costs for the competitive product B, even though the rival can 
have higher costs because of the anticompetitive actions of the domi-
nant firm. For example, if there are increasing returns to scale in mar-
ket B, the denial of scale to the competitive firm in market B because 
of the dominant firm's actions will result in highel costs for the com-
petitive firm. Thus, if this standard is applied, the competitive firm 
can be foreclosed because it appears to be inefficient even when it 
would have been efficient (and therefore not foreclosed) but for the 
anticompetitive effects of the requirement contract.2l 
Second, even a higher-cost competitor can constrain price and 
increase consumer surplus. Therefore inefficient rivals should not be 
automatically excluded.22 This is a fundamental flaw of the test which 
looks only on the production side of the market and disregards the 
one of the fo lloWing elements (as well as other e lements of a Section 2 claim): 
(1) after alloca ting all discounts and rebates attributable to the entire bW1dle 
of products to the competitive p roduct, the d efendant sold the competitive 
product below its incremental cost for the competitive product; (2) the defen-
dant is likely to recoup these short-term losses; a nd (3) the bllndled disco unt 
or rebate p rogram has had or is likely to have an adverse effect on competi-
tion."). See also ELHA UGE, supra note 2, at 413. 
'0 The AMC uses the words "incremental cos t" in its cost criterion. Often 
a"erage vari able cost (AVC) is used instead. The EU uses the te rmino logy 
dverage avoida ble costs (AAC) to denote costs that can be avoided jf the units 
in queStion are no t prod uced. See infra section II.D. However, it sho uld be 
understood that AAC and AVC include the cost of addition;]l plants (or plant 
expansion) and fixed investment required to produce the additionaillnits. 
" See Econ omides & Lianos, SUpl"a note 2, at 20; ELHAUGE, Slty l"a note 2, 
at 412. 
'YI Excluding entrant:..; on the grounds o f productive inefficiency (or cre-
ating tes ts tha t w ould exclude less efficient entrants o ut of hand) can reduce 
consumer surplus and increase alloca tive inefficiency (divergence of prices 
from costs) . See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Access and 
Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the "Efficiellt Component Pricing Rule"7, 
40 ANTITRUST BULL. 557 (1995); Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, The 
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effects of market organization on consumer surplus. Since consumer 
surplus can increase because of entty of even an inefficient rival when 
the inefficient rival prices below the monopoly price of the dominant 
firm, requiring productive efficiency of a nondominant rival (as the 
test does) may conflict with achieving higher consumer surplus. 
Thus, application of the AMC standard will result in a number of 
false negatives to the detriment of consumers. If a test such as the one 
proposed by the AMC is to be employed, it should compare the effec-
tive price with the rival's costs when the rival is operating efficiently. 
The crucial question is whether the rival in market B could survive if 
acting efficiently, not the monopolist, and if the entry or survival of 
the rival constrains prices and increases consumer surplus. 
Third, in the presence of product differentiation (either in variety 
or in quality) the AMC test makes little sense. Since a rival to the dom-
inant firm does not offer the same products, why should we be using 
the dominant firm's cos~s to evaluate the survival of the rival's prod-
ucts that differ in quality and variety from those of the dominant firm? 
Moreover, when the products are differentiated, consumers may gain 
from the presence of additional varieties and qualities offered by the 
rival even if the rival prices higher than the dominant firm.23 
Fourth, if such a test is to be used, it should be applied only to the 
contested units of products A or B (or both), and not to all units of A or 
to all lmits of 8, again asking the questions whether the rival can sur-
vive under the requirement practice and if consumer surplus increases 
in the presence of the rival.24 In many markets, a Significant portion of 
Inefficiency of the ECPR Yet Again: A Reply to Larsol1, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 429 
(1998); Nicholas Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency of M-ECPR, in DOWN TO 
THE WIRE: STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION AND REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGfES 142 (Allan 1. Shampine ed., 2003) . 
" See Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real alld Proper Antirust Wel-
fare Standard (Statement to AMC, Nov. 4, 2005) and Steven C Salop, Exclusion-
ary Conduct, Effect 011 COl1sUJllerS, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 
ANIDRUST L} 311 (2006); Nicholas Economides, Quality Variatiolls in the Circu-
lar Model ot" Differentiated Products, 23 REGIONAL ScI. & URB. ECON. 235 (1993). 
CI This, of course, is not because antitrust is concerned with the survi va l 
of the rival per se, but because the survival of the rival will constrain price 
and increase variety and quality to the benefit of consumers. 
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the sales of the dorrunant firm is uncontested by competitors. This may 
be because of reputation, fear of punishment of executives if some-
thing goes wrong when they do not buy from the dominant firm 
("nobody gets fired for buying from IBM"), complementary invest-
me~ts by buyers of the dominant product, lirrutations in the produc-
tion capacity of the competitor, and many other reasons. Obviously the 
dominant firm does not offer a loyalty discount to attract buyers to the 
uncontested part of the demand since it already is able to sell these 
units at full price. Instead, the requirement / loyalty discount is offered 
to attract customers in the contested part of the demand. Therefore its 
impact has tv be analyzed on that part of the demand. VVhether the 
loyalty discount is applied to the contested pMt of the demand or not 
can make a big difference to the outcome of the test, as we will see 
below in the discussion of the EU guidance standard, which applies 
the discount only to the contested part of the demand. 
Fifth, the loyalty / requirement discount reduces price transparency 
and thereby may decrease competition. It will be difficult for a rival to 
accurately calculate the effective price offered by the dominant firm to 
particular buyers and thereby attempt to match it.25 This uncertainty 
may reduce price competition, and this is ignored by the proposed test. 
Sixth, the recoupment prong is irrelevant because it is not clear 
that the monopolist actually loses money under the requirement con-
tract compared to the but-for world. The difference between prices 
with and without the requirement contract does not necessarily imply 
losses for the monopolist because the monopolist can increase both a 
la carte and bundle prices as the introduction and acceptance of the 
requirement contract gives him more market power. When the domi-
nantfirm's price outside the requirement / loyalty contract is higher 
than in the but-for world, this is an indication that the action is anti-
competitive.26 To see this, consider the model of Greenlee et alY They 
25 Additionally, buyers may find it difficult to compare prices in a la 
carte and bundled offerings. See Barry Na lebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, 50 
A NTITRUST BULL. 321, 322 (2U05) . 
26 Sec Economides & Lianos, supra note 2, at 21; Einer Elha uge, Defining 
Retter Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. 1. REV. 253, 284-94 (200:1). 
See Greenlee et aI., supra note 2. 
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show how a monopolist can extend his monopoly in market A to mar-
ket B through offering the bundling scheme with a requirement that all 
or almost all purchases be made from the monopolist and simultane-
ously increasing the price of the monopolized product when it is 
offered on a stand-alone basis. Greenlee et at. show in their theorem 2 
that the application of this bundling scheme reduces consumer welfare. 
They devise a test to ascertain whether there are consumer losses for 
the case of undifferentiated products: "If the firm maximizes profits 
and the standalone price of A exceeds the initial price of A, then we 
can infer that the bundled rebate reduces consumer welfare."~ The 
fact that a dominant firm's profit sacrifice is not necessary in a 
requirement/loyalty rebate is shared by the European Commission: 
"Conditional rebates can have such [actual and potential foreclosure] 
effects without necessarily entailing a sacrifice for the dominant 
undertaking,"29 with accompanying footnote : "In that regard, the 
assessment of conditional rebates differs from that of predation, 
which always entails a sacrifice."~ Thus, the analysis of requirement/ 
loyalty programs under the modified predatory pricing standard of 
the AMC is misguided.3! 
Seventh, the acceptance of the requirement contract by buyers 
does not necessarily imply higher consumer surplus since buyers find 
themselves in a prisoners' dilemma setting. It may be optimal individ-
ually for each buyer to buy under the requirement so that he is not 
penalized by the higher prices outside the requirement, but collec-
tively all buyers lose because of the increase in market power of the 
monopolist as more buyers accept the requirement. An individual 
28 Id. at 23. See also E LHAUGE, supra note 2, at 409 ("Consumer welfare 
will be harmed without any substantial foreclosure, as long as the standalone 
price exceeds the but-for independent monopoly price, unless there are offset-
ting efficiencies."). 
Ell Article 82 Guidance, supra note 1, at '111 4. 
[d. at 14 n.26. 
31 Additionally, bundling can also be used to crea te threats of higher Q la 
carte prices, even if all consumers buy under the bundle and therefore the 
threat of buying at higher a la carte prices is not enforced at equilibrium. See, 
e.g. , Barry Nalebuff, Tried and True Exclusion, 1 COMPETITION POL' Y INT'L 41 
(2005). 
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buyer's acquiescence to buying under the requirement does not imply 
that collectively buyers are better off compared to the but-for world. 
Eighth, the third prong of the test is also irrelevant. There is no 
need to look for additional anticompetitive consequences since the 
requirement/loyalty practice itself can result in such. 
In summary, compared to the but-for world, consumer surplus can 
decrease because of the introduction of the requi~ement practice even in 
AMC's safe harbor where the effective price exceeds avoidable cost. 
Prod uct differentiatiuf'. makes the safe harbor even less applicable. 
Adoption of the AMC standard could result in exclusionary conduct 
that would not violate the test. Because of all the reasons above, the safe 
harbor proposed by the AMC-no antitrust violation exists if the result-
ing effective price is above average variable cost of product B of the 
monopolist in product A-may result in exclusionary conduct that 
would not violate the test. The above shows that there are many actions 
that qualify for the AMC safe harbor that are still harmful to consumers. 
C. The Peace Health standard of the Ninth Circuit 
for multiproduct conditional discounts 
The PeaceHealth standard is essentially the first prong of the AMC 
test. It works as follows. Take all the conditional discounts and apply 
them to all the units of product B (the nonrnonopolized product) sold 
to a particular buyer by the monopolist in A. An antitmst violation 
exists only if the resulting effective price is below the average variable 
cost of the monopolist.32 This safe harbor standard was adopted by the 
U.s. Department of Justice under the George W. Bush administration 
in the single-firm section 2 report" but was recently rescinded by the 
Department of Justice under the Obama administration, together with 
the rest of the enforcement provisions of the section 2 report.34 
32 See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906-10 (9th 
Cir.2008). 
" See Dep't of Justice, C01npetitio11 and M011opoly: Single-Firm Conduct 
Under Section 2 o.f the Shennan Act 101 (Sept. 2008). 
" See Press Release, Justice Deparhnent Withdraws Report on Antitrust 
Monopoly Law, (May 11, 2009), amilable at http://wvVwusdoj.gov I atr/public 
I press_releases/2009/245710.htm . 
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All the criticisms of the AMC standard applYt except that recoup-
ment is not required by the PeaceHealth standard. Adoption of th is 
standard would result in many violations that would not be caught. 
D. The EU Article 82 GuidancF 
To apply the European Corrunission test, one first determines the 
"effective price" by applying all discolUlts to the "contestable" units 
of product B (the norunonopolized product) in the multiproduct case, 
or to the "contestable" units of product A in the single-product case. 
The contestable part of the market is defined as "how much of a cus-
tomer's purchase requirements can realistically be switched to a 
rival."36 An antitrust violation exists if the resulting effective price is 
below average avoidable cost of the monopolist. An antitrust violation 
may exist if the resulting effective price is above average avoidable 
cost of the monopolist, based on more detailed examination. In partiCll-
lar, the Commission notes: 
Where the effective price is between [average avoidable cost] and [long run 
average incremental cost], the Commission will investigate whether other 
factors point to the conclusion that entry or expansion ev~'n by as efficient 
competitors is likely to be affected. In this context, the Commission will 
investigate whether and to what extent rivals have realistic and effective 
counterstrategies at their disposal, for instance their capacity to also use a 
"noncontestable" portion of their buyer's demand as leverage to decrease 
the price for the relevant range. Where competitors do nut have such coun-
terstrategies at their disposal, the Commission will consider that the rebate 
scheme is capable of foreclosing equally efficient competitors. q 
This test uses the monopolist's costs rather than the competitor's 
costs, even though the entrant can have higher costs because of the 
anticompetitive actions of the monopolist; in any case, a higher-cost 
competitor can constrain price and increase consumer surplus-there-
fore inefficient competitors should not be excluded. The test is 
applied correctly to the contested units (in either a single-product or a 
m ul tiproduct case). The impact of the loyalty discount is cor~ectly 
Ell Article 82 Guidance, supra note 1, at 'II 14. 
36 Id. at 'illS. 
37 ELf Article 82 Guidance, supra note 1, at 'II 43. Long run average incre-
mental cost includes all variable and fixed costs. 
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applied to the contested units, where its effect is large, rather than to 
all units, which include the portion of the monopolist's sales that are 
not contested and would have remained with the monopolist in the 
abse~ce of a discount. 3S Because the European Commission applies 
the discounts to a relatively small number of units while the AMC 
and PeaceHealth standards apply the discounts to all units, the Com-
m ission approach will correctly discover violations which would 
remain undiscovered by the AMC and PeaceHealth standards. 
For example, assume that the total requirement of a buyer is 100 
units, the dominant firm's list price is $100, and the dominant firm 
offers a lump-sum rebate of $1000 conditional on the dominant firm 
selling a number of units that includes all the uncontested units and 
some of the contested units of this buyer. If the contested number of 
units is 80 and the discount is available when at least 20 units are 
bought from the dominant firm, the effective price is $((100x80) -
1000)/80 = $7000/ 80 = $87.50, and the percentage discount on the 
contested units is (list price - effective price) / (list price) = 12.5%. As 
the contested number of units decreases and the required number of 
units to get the discount increases, the implied discounts rise dramati-
cally as seen in the table. For example, when the contested number of 
units is 30, the percentage discount is 33%; when the contested num-
ber of lmits is 20, the percentage discount is 50%; 15 contested units 
imply a discount of 67%; 10 contested lLnitS, a discount of 100% (zero 
effective price); and 5 contested units a discount of 200% and a nega-
tive effective price. Notice that this lump sum discount, which is only 
12.5% of the total revenue of the dominant firm from this customer 
($1000/$100x80 = 12.5%), has crucial anticompetitive consequences 
when the contested number of units is relatively small. The effective 
price can even be negative (here if the number of contested units is 
38 In applying this standard in its Illtel decision, the European Commis-
sion notes tha t the contestable part of the market can be small. European 
Union, Press Release, Antitrust: Commission imposes fine of €1.06 bn on Intel 
for abuse of dominant position; orders Intel to cease illegal practices (May 13, 
2009), a'llailable at http://europa.eu / rapid / pressReleasesAction.do?reference 
=IP / 09 /745&fonnat=HTML ("Because computer manufacturers are depend-
ent on Intel for a majority of their x86 CPU supplies, only a limited part of a 
computer manufacturer's x86 CPU requirements is open to competition at 
any given time."). 
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below 10, i.e., contested market share is beiow 10%) and therefore 
impossible to match by a competitor.39 Thus, in cases where the con-
tested market share is small (here 10% or less), one can establish anti-
competitive foreclosure effects of the requirement contract even 
without knowledge of costs, since costs are not negative. The table 
summarizes the results based on different assumptions on the num-
ber of contested units . 
Table 
Contested Required Effective <Effective Percentage 
Units by Units for Price OIL Price!! Discount 011 
the Rival Discount Contested (List Price) Contested 
are a t Lens t Units Units' 
80 20 $87.5 87.5% 12.5% 
30 70 $67 67% 33% 
20 80 $50 50% 50% 
15 85 $33 33% 67% 
10 90 $0 0% 100% 
5 95 -$100 -100% 200% 
*The variable "percentage discount on contested units" is defined as (list price - effec-
tive price)/(list price):o 100% - (effective price)/(list price). 
39 In its Intel decision, the European Commission provides an example 
of a rival to the dominant firm that was unable to "sell" its product at zero 
price because of Intel's loyalty/requirement practice. A computer manufac-
turer refused an offer to "buy" crus fromAdvanced Micro Devices, Inc 
(AMD) at zero price because, if it did, it would forgo Intel's loyalty discount, 
which was based on the requirement that this buyer buy a very large share of 
its CPU needs from Intel. Id. ("Moreover, in order to be able to compete with 
the Intel rebates, for the part of the computer manufacturers' supplies that 
was up for grabs, a competitor that was just as efficient as Intel would have 
had to offer a price for its CPUs lower than its costs of producing those CPUs, 
even if the average price of its CPUs was lower than that of Intel. For exam-
ple, rival chip manufacturer AMD offered one million free CPUs to one par-
ticular computer manufacturer. If the computer manufacturer had accepted 
all of these, it would have lost Intel's rebate on its many millions of remaining 
CPU purchases, and would have been worse off overall simply for having 
accepted this highly competitive offer. In the end, the computer manufacturer 
took only 160,000 CPUs for free."). 
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E. The Ortho test 
Under the standard in OrOw, a loyalty / requirement bundled d is-
count by a monopolist is considered anticompetitive when either "(a) 
the monopolist has priced below its average variable cost or (b) the 
plaintiff is at least as efficient a producer of the competitive prod uct 
as the defendant, but .. . the defendant's pricing makes it unprofitable 
for the plaintiff to continue to produce."4o 
The first test for liability in Ortho is very much like the A.t\llC tes t, 
examining whether the dominant firm is pricing below its incremen-
tal cost. The second alternative requirement for liability tests whether 
an efficient plaintiff in product B is able to survive given the pricing 
of the dominant firm. This test is different from the AMC test in the 
following ways. First, in the absence of joint production or jOint distri-
bution cost savings, it allows liability to be established when the dom-
inant firm and the rival have the same cost ClIrue/junction for product 
B, but the pricing actions (requirement / loyalty programs) of the dom-
inant firm restrict the scale of the rival so that its unit cost at the scale 
at which it operates is so high that it does not allow it to survive. 
Thus, it eliminates one of the problems of the AMC test. 
Second, this test is based on the efficiency of the rival in produc-
tion of only product B. It is less likely to find liability than the Euro-
pean Commission test because it essentia lly t reats the total 
production of B by the plaintiff as the "contested units" rather than 
the truly contested number, which may be smaller. 
In general, there is no correspondence between consumer surplus 
changes and success or failure in the Ortlw test. Thus, while the Ortho 
test may provide indications of liability, it cannot be Jsed as a rule for 
antitrust liabiiity. 
F. Structured rule of reason 
Under the structured rule of reason approacr: that 1 propose, the 
court should .ook at a number of variables to (\scer~ain whether a 
requirement / loyalty program violates antitrust iaw, with the central 
40 Ortho Diagnostic Sys./ Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc. , 920 F. Supp. 455, 469 
(S.DN.Y. 1996). 
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question being whether the introduction of the requirement/loyalty 
program reduces consumer surplus. Using this approach, a safe har-
bor cannot be established based on a price / cost test. This is essen-
tially because changes in consumer surplus as a result of entry or 
expanded operation of a rival nondominant firm do not, in general, 
correspond directly to any price/ cost comparison, as I have argued in 
the criticism of the AMC standard. Under the structured rule of rea-
:,on standard, a violation can be established even when none is found 
by the previous tests , and in particular even when the calculated 
"effective" price is above the average variable cost of the dominant 
firm .41 
The court should look for reductions of consumer surplus as a 
result of the introduction and acceptance of the requirement/loyalty 
practice. Among other circumstances, anticompetitive effects are 
established if any of the following is true in cases of homogeneous 
goods: 
1. the effective price based on contested units (defined ab ove for 
either good A or B, or a combination of A and B) is below the incre-
mental cost of the dominant firm including an allocation of avoid-
able fixed costs; 
2. the effective price based on contested units (defined above for 
either good A or B, or a combination of A and B) is below the incre-
mental cost of the competing firm including an allocation of avoid-
able fixed costs, and it can be shown that the elimination o f the 
competing fi rm reduces competition and decreases consumer sur-
plus; or 
3. the dominant firm' s price outside the requirement/ loyalty contract 
is higher than in the but-fo r world. 
When the effective price based on contested Lmits (defined above 
for either good A or B, or a combination of A and B) is below the 
;acremental cost of the dominant firm including an allocation of 
avoidable fixed costs, the dominant firm is selling below its own cost. 
There is no plausible justification for this, so this is a clear indic~tion 
of an antitrust violation. 
41 In LePage's v. 3M Co , 324 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2003), the court did no t 
require a price / cost test to establish liability. 
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When the effective price based on contested units (defined above 
for either good A or B, or a combination of A and B) is below the 
incrementa: cost of the competing firm including an allocation of 
avoidable fixed costs, the dominant firm is selling the contested units 
at (in effective price that cannot be matched by the competitor, leading 
to the w ithdrawal of the competitor from the market. If the rival is 
equally efficient as the dominant firm, this test collapses to test (1), 
and antitrust liability is immediately established. If the rival fi rm is 
inefficient and its costs are higher than the dominant firm's w hen 
evaluated at the production levels of both firms at the market equilib-
rium under the requirement contract, the court should first look at 
whether the rival has the same cost curve!function as the dominant 
firm and whether its scale has been curtailed because of the anticom-
petitive acts of the dominant firm. If both of these are true, we fall 
back to test (1). If the rival's cost curve is higher than the dominant 
fi rm's in the but-for world, the court should analyze whether the ben-
efits to consumers in the but-for world are eliminated or d iminished 
by the requirement / loyalty practice. 
As discussed earlie:- in the section on the AMC standard, if the 
price outside the requirement (for example, the a la carte price in the 
multiproduct case) is above the but-for price, this is a clear indication 
of a reduction in consumer surplus as an effect of the introduction of 
the requirement contract.'ll Additionally, when re-entry is difficul t, 
any temporary benefit to consumers arising from low prices that 
leads to the rival's exit will disappear after the rival's exit when the 
dominant firm will increase its prices. 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I have discussed various standards that have been proposed to 
establish antitrust liability in cases of requirement / loyalty contracts. I 
have criticized the AMC test because, among other reasons, it failed to 
establish a correspondence between consumer surplus reductions as a 
result of the requirement / loyalty practice and the price / cost test it 
proposed. Additionally, I showed that the AMC test will tend to show 
no liability where liability is present. The European Commission 
See sources cited supra note 2. 
L O YA LTY RE BA T ES 279 
price/cost test is significantly better than the AMC test because:t cor-
rec tly applies the loyalty discounts only to the units contested by 
rivals. However, even this test falls short for a number of reasons, 
including not taking into accolU1t product differentiation and the fact 
that even an inefficient competitor can constrain a dominant firm's 
pricing and thereby increase consumer surplus. J proposed a struc-
tured rule of reason test that does not include a safe harbor price /cost 
test but instead relies on consumer surplus comparisons. In the case 
uf homogeneous goods, I show how price/cos t tests may be used as 
part of the structured rule of reason test to establish liability. 
